Distinctions Between Qualia and Consciousness Cores
"Qualia" is an older, well established and widely used term, while "consciousness cores", having been introduced in this book, are new on the scene. In actuality both concepts are theoretical and imprecisely defined. The term "qualia" has typically been used in relation to the representation of a face and to simple colors. The color red, for example, "as distinct from any source it might have in a physical object" (Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary) has been typically regarded as a quale (single for qualia).
In many cases the two terms, qualia and consciousness core, may have similar usage but there are also distinct differences between the concepts. One significant difference between the two terms is in the theories which support them. Recall that in representationalist theories, a representation such as that of a visual object, is formed in the mind and the mind then becomes aware of the representation. We shall not attempt to describe qualia in great detail at this time but they are supported by representationalist theory. They are entire representations and present sensations and objects for appreciation by consciousness. Confusion between "qualia" and "consciousness cores" can easily arise because both can be applied to perceptions such as colors, tastes, or sounds, etc. In practice "qualia" is most often used in relation to such simple perceptions apparently because its theoretical position has not been sufficiently elaborated for theorists to feel comfortable in using the term for complex perceptions.
On the other hand we regard consciousness cores as individual sensory inputs which serve to comprise either simple or complex perceptions. Unlike the concept of qualia, consciousness cores are more apt to be combined to form perceptions. Theoretically they are the building blocks of consciousness comprising not only touches and colors or other simple sensations but also complexes such as memories, abstractions, and concepts. In this book "consciousness core" is used in conjunction with the version of the identity theory we are promulgating that consciousness ultimately consists of consciousness cores. We will often use "consciousness core" in contexts which differ from the customary use of "qualia."
Another difference between the two terms is in relation to the conscious vis-à-vis the subconscious. "Qualia" is most often used in relation to entirely conscious perceptions whereas consciousness cores may or may not be conscious. They are most frequently unconscious. In distinction to qualia we hold that a conscious touch or a color may be a consciousness core but a large conscious complex (a memory, concept, etc.) would be composed of consciousness cores which are unconscious.
"Qualia" are sometimes considered to represent whole external objects. Even though objects always have a number of aspects, qualia are customarily thought to represent them all at once. Bertrand Russell (1914) states, for example, "...mountains, only become data [qualia] when we see them." (Italics ours.) In his description the mountain is a quale but we prefer to consider the color, size, height, etc., to be consciousness cores which comprise the larger concept of the mountain The concept of consciousness cores which we are offering applies only to individual qualities. How we become aware of objects as wholes, according to our theory of consciousness cores, will constitute a substantial portion of the remainder of this book.
A further, very significant difference between qualia and consciousness cores is that we regard emotions as consisting of consciousness cores, while the term, qualia, is not used in connection with those functions. We consider emotions, "ideas" (exactly what the term includes is debatable), and memories to be inputs to consciousness just as are sensations from the external senses or from the body organs. This is not the customary way of regarding emotions but, as perceptions, they arise consciously in the same subjective manner that other inputs arise. All inputs have to enter the same door of consciousness, so to speak, and in our view ideas, emotions, and memories should not be set aside as being different from other inputs in relation to consciousness.