In the first chapter, issues of
line-drawing and classification are addressed.
How do we decide whether a given entity is a person? How do we determine whether a person is alive
or dead? What are the boundaries which
define an object? How does
classification work? Do we discover
categories by looking at the world around us, or do we impose categories on the
world? Are there general criteria for
deciding whether a particular system of classification "works"? What sorts of problems do borderline cases
create for systems of classification?
In
chapter two, the differences between philosophical, scientific and legal truth
are discussed in two parts. In the first
section, the speakers focus on defining truth.
Problems of relativism and the myth of objectivity are considered, as is
the relationship between truth and justice, virtue and success. Distinctions are drawn between the nature and
value of truth, and between competing theories or explanations of truth. The second set of lectures focus on
reasonable methods for discerning truth.
Are there generally accepted means for arriving at these disparate
notions of truth? How does one's intent
influence the procedural methods by which truth is attained? What constitutes a rational belief? Can it ever be rational to hold irrational
beliefs? What constitutes a valid proof
for a proposition? How would this differ
from a proper justification or understanding?
This
discussion leads into issues of causality and explanation which are dealt with
in chapter three. What is it for one
event or object to "cause" another?
Is the relation between cause and effect necessary or contingent? Can an effect precede its cause? Can an effect also be the cause of the event
having occurred? What role do
probability and predictability play into the causal picture? What bearing do laws and rules have on
causation? Issues of culpability,
liability, harm and negligence are also discussed as are the perennial
questions, "Why is there something rather than nothing?" and
"Why this particular state of affairs rather than some other?
The
next chapter on free will and determinism is divided into three parts. It is interesting to note the different ways
that the free will/determinist debate is set up by thinkers from different
disciplines based on what each thinks is the important issues involved. Not only do the answers differ, but so do the
questions which are asked. Distinctions
are drawn between soft determinism and compatibilism, libertarianism and contra-causal freedom. One view of human action defines us as wholly
physical systems. Yet, such systems are
conditioned in a various ways. The
problem of free will on this account consists in asking whether we can be
morally responsible for our actions while acknowledging that at least on some
physical level of description, our behavior is determined.
Chapter
five focuses on the exercise of decision-making at the boundaries of life and
death. What criteria determine the
proper allocation of decision-making authority among entities with competing
interests in and perspectives on an outcome?
What are the implications that flow from the choice of a decision-maker?
In the sixth chapter, the
lecturers address various issues of race and gender. The difference between racism and racialism
is discussed. This framework is applied
to other forms of differential treatment based on ground identification such as
age, gender, sexual orientation, disability, immigration policy, and so
on. Are we all created equal, or are
some "more equal" than others?
To what degree is human equality a contingent fact of history? This includes a treatment of the use and
misuse of the notion of natural selection, and a discussion on the evolution of
human sexuality. Specific issues of
discrimination are considered, with references to feminism and affirmative
action.