The Fix Is In

Misleading and inaccurate information was created to push the blame and guilt on others so that decision makers at the highest levels of city and state agencies — with the cooperation of New York City’s DA’s office — would not be blamed. It’s abundantly clear that the Deutsche Bank building fire wasn’t an anomaly, freak accident or a communication breakdown. Life-saving rules and protocols were sidestepped by city, state and federal agencies. Contractors and top decision makers were complicit in the cover-up, and in the distortion of facts. The result of their malfeasance was a preventable disaster which caused the deaths of two firefighters, and injuries to more than 100. What was initially thought to be a routine fire rapidly escalated into a blazing inferno, a seven alarm fire that deployed 224 firefighters and that took over 7 hours to control. The minute-by-minute details of the Deutsche Bank building fire were brought to light by the Fire Department Safety and Inspection Services Command Investigative Report (Case Number SB 75/07 Fatal Injury to Firefighter Joseph Graffagnino, Ladder Company 5 and Firefighter Robert Beddia, Engine Company 24). The details of this official report were corroborated by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), an institute within the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). NIOSH is a federal agency responsible for conducting research and making recommendations for the prevention of work-related injuries and illness. NIOSH created the Firefighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program to examine deaths of firefighters in the line of duty so that fire departments, firefighters, fire service organizations, safety experts and researchers could learn from incidents such as the Deutsche Bank fire, and make recommendations to prevent similar occurrences. The FDNY Fatal Investigative 176 page report was more detailed than the NIOSH report. There were also variations between the two reports because of different viewpoints expressed by investigators of the respective agencies during and after the fire. The DA’s report also differed from the FDNY and NIOSH reports, and from a report by the New York City Department of Investigation (DOI), which investigates questionable administrative issues. More confusing still, were significant and incriminating discrepancies in firefighters’ eyewitness taped interviews of the event. The DA never mentioned the existence of the EPA fans in his statement or in the charges against those he indicted. The DA also contradicted the medical examiner’s cause of death. The internal fans brought the fire and smoke lower into the building and were responsible for killing two firefighters and injuring more than a 100, according to FDNY officers and New York City’s medical examiner. The owner of the building, the Lower Manhattan Development Corporation (LMDC), had a signed contract with New York City that they would abide by all the city’s building and fire codes and New York State’s building and fire regulations. If there was a discrepancy between codes, they would use the stricter code. However, they failed to abide by any safety codes or regulations; and yet the DA never mentioned the building owner’s responsibilities, and that they never adhered to the building and fire safety contracts they signed. It was more than apparent that misleading and inaccurate information was created to push the blame and guilt on others so that decision makers at the highest levels of city and state agencies — with the cooperation of New York City’s DA’s office — would not be blamed. Federal agencies that were involved in harmful decisions on a day-to-day basis for more than two years were not mentioned. From the information gathered, most of which was public record, both state and federal prosecutors took a hands-off approach to pursuing in-depth investigations. The DA’s office controlled the case, deciding how to investigate, prosecute, and conversely, who not to prosecute.