Adopted Land, Beloved Land

How Eddie and the 3rd Battalion, 27th Marine Marines would play their part on D-day had been mapped out days before sailing for Iwo Jima from Saipan. If all went as scheduled, amphibious landing would occur on the morning of February 19, along the southwestern shoreline, immediately to the east of Mt. Suribachi, a 556-foot bare rock summit which comprised the southern most and highest point of the island. There was no other frontage on the island that could support such a large-scale Marine landing. Japanese Gen. Kuribayashi was very much aware of that fact. Hidden among an elaborate honeycomb network of entrenchments within the summit, Kuribayashi placed an assortment of heavy artillery, mortars, and machine guns pointing toward the jet black sandy beaches to the east. Further inland and parallel to the beach there was a forbidding series of terraces with hidden concrete steel-reinforced blockhouses (above-ground bunkers) or pillboxes scattered about. Each was armed with one or more .30-caliber machineguns pointing toward the beach and the expected advancing Marine line. Kuribayashi’s plan called for the Marines to land unmolested, then to shower them with every assortment of weaponry once they concentrated on the beaches in order to maximize American casualties. Japanese defenses did not end there. It was only a prelude of things to come once the Marines moved further inland. Gen. Kuribayashi had no illusions of victory against the Marines. He prepared for death and expected each of his men to kill at least ten Americans before they died in combat or by suicide. If the Navy was unsuccessful in annihilating at least those frontline guns – they couldn’t be seen, they were so well camouflaged and embedded – the Marines would catch hell from their front and left when they landed on the beach. Besides the 5th Marine Division, the 4th Marine Division participated in the opening invasion, with the 3rd Marine Division bringing up the rear. There were a total of over 70,000 men fully committed to the campaign. During the early phase of the invasion, the 4th Division – utilizing initially the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 23rd Marine Regiment, and the 1st and 3rd Battalions, 25th Marine Regiments – would land to the right of the Fifth and secure the eastern beachhead before swinging north toward the eastern end of Motoyama Airfield No. 1, then northeast toward Motoyama Airfield No. 2. Meanwhile, the Fifth would utilize the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 28th Marine Regiment, the extreme left flank of the American line, to drive across the neck of Iwo Jima and isolate Mt. Suribachi from the rest of the island, while the 1st and 2nd Battalion, 27th Marine Regiment (to the right of the 28th) advanced north toward the western end of Motoyama Airfield No. 1 where it planned to link up with the 23rd Marine Regiment. Landing in waves just five minutes apart, Eddie and the 3rd Battalion would be the last of the 27th Marine Regiment to touch ashore ninety minutes after the first Marines landed. Its orders were to serve as a reserve unit for the advancing 1st and 2nd Battalions and to be utilized only if counterattacked. In total, the nearly 3,000 men comprising the 27th Marine Regiment would land in eighteen waves. There were immediate concerns voiced by Captain Munson, Company G, 3rd Battalion, related to the tactical deployment of the 27th Marine Regiment. He believed (and it turned out rightly so) that the 1st and 2nd Battalions would never clear the beaches before elements of the 3rd Battalion would crash into their rear. Things would be so jumbled up on the beach that there would be mass confusion among the rank and file. There was also concern among other officers that the regiment would be bunch up on the beach inviting an easy target for Japanese gunners. They wanted to withhold landing the 3rd Battalion until the others battalions moved inland off the beach. Colonel Robertson thought otherwise. Though he appreciated the men’s apprehension and alternative designs, he believed that his 3rd Battalion must be on the beach as soon as possible in order to lend any support to the 1st and 2nd Battalions as the evolving situation dictated. Reveille sounded at 4:30 a.m. on February 19, 1945. The sun had yet to rise as the Sandoval lay in the water, idling, twelve miles to the west of Iwo Jima. As the first glimmer of light appeared in the east, the men could see the silhouette of the island off in the distance, especially the Mt. Suribachi summit. Three hundred yards to the northeast of that locale, the men of the 27th Marine Regiment prepared themselves physically and mentally to land on designated Red Beach 1 and 2. As the ship neared the island, debarkation orders blasted over the loudspeaker system as nearby U.S.S. Tennessee’s 14-inch guns sent salvo after salvo toward their intended targets. The preinvasion bombardment began at 8:30 a.m. Meanwhile, the twenty-four LCVPs were launched and circled the ship prior to and after picking up the 1st and 2nd Battalions, as planned. The 3rd Battalion followed. The concussion produced by the Tennessee guns brought the battleship closer to the Sandoval creating a wave action that reached the top edge (the gunwale) of the side of the LCVPs. Fortunately, the seas were relatively calm that morning with only two-foot swells, and all the men boarded the LCVPs without incident. The men took notice of the LST Hospital ship anchored a hundred yards to the north of the Sandoval. For many of the men, including Eddie, it would be their future home, if they were fortunate enough to survive their wounds. The first wave of Marines landed at 9:02 a.m., five minutes after the targeted naval bombardment lifted. For many of the men, the initial landing was a bewildering moment. Not so much as a whisper from the Japanese could be heard.