John M. Fitzgerald
 |
|
The United States established a colony in the Philippines following the Spanish-American War and an unsuccessful revolution. Promising the Filipino people independence, they were on that road when the Second World War erupted in December, 1941. The Philippine Commonwealth had brought in retired Army Chief of Staff Douglas MacArthur to prepare themselves for self defense. He had a goal of self- sufficiency by April, 1944. Until then the under strength, poorly equipped, and in the Philippines, old American forces would protect them against the Japanese. Family in Crisis examines the heroic but futile efforts of the Americans and their fledgling allies, and then chronicles the superb guerrilla warfare efforts mounted by the Filipino people, aided by a small group of American survivors of Bataan and beyond. In many cases the Americans leading the effort were inexperienced reserve officers, many only Lieutenants. Their Filipino counterparts ranged from retirees to students, many of whom became the country’s leaders after independence was achieved after the war. All the characters are there from MacArthur and his old Brigadiers in 1942 through the Captains, Lieutenants, and Sergeants who led the insurgent forces. Also on hand is Ferdinand Marcos who rose from 3rd Lieutenant to Lt. Colonel and ultimately to President and Dictator. The United States kept its promise, the Filipinos were fiercely loyal, and the Family in Crisis prevailed.
Colonel John M. Fitzgerald was brought up in the Philippines as the son of attended career Army officer and the American School in Pasay, Rizal through the tenth grade before returning to the United States in 1949. Enlisting in the Army in 1951 he was selected for the United States Military Academy entering in 1952.
Leaving the Academy for academic failure in 1953, he returned to the enlisted ranks and was commissioned from the rank of Staff Sergeant after graduating from the University of Pittsburgh in 1955. He earned a MBA from the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania in 1969 and is also a graduate of the Air War College, Marine Corps Command and Staff College, and the Defense Intelligence School. His thirty two years of military service included three years with special forces in Latin America, two tours in the Republic of Vietnam, and tours on both the Army and Joint Staff. He ended his career in 1983 following four years as the Army Attaché to Singapore. Since that time he has taught at Jones College in Jacksonville, Florida and worked for twelve years for the Grumman Aerospace Corporation retiring again in 1998. His military service has permitted him numerous returns to the Philippines. Colonel Fitzgerald resides in Fruit Cove, Florida with his wife since 1955, Marianne Elizabeth Moren. They have four children, seven grandchildren, and one great grandchild.
MacArthur began a ten year plan to develop officers both from the Philippine Military Academy (a carbon copy of West Point) and a viable Reserve Officer Training Program at the major Philippine universities. He arranged for the appointment of three Deputy Chiefs of Staff, all graduates of West Point; Brigadier General Lim(USMA’14), Operations, Colonel Segundo(USMA’17), Intelligence, and Colonel Rafael Garcia(USMA’16), Logistics. Lim actually was the Chief of Staff since Major General Basilio Valdes (MD-StoTomas’11) was a Medical Officer and doubled as the President’s personal physician. Lim, who had retired from the U.S.Army as a LT. Colonel with a minor heart condition, was a strong organizer and MacArthur let him run with the expansion. He activated the First Philippine Division by 1936 with only a token cadre and placed it in 1941 under the command of Segundo, one of the ten Filipino graduates of the USMA at West Point, organized some artillery battalions which were promised new guns by 1940 from the U.S., and developed a cross training program with the Philippine Constabulary which would form the shell of a second division if needed. MacArthur stated publicly that he would have a credible defense force by April, 1942, but by 1940 the tensions between the United States and Japan were most evident in the islands. MacArthur directed the formation of ten reserve divisions to be filled by local conscription and officered by his new ROTC graduates beefed up by the U.S. advisors which had been provided as promised. The only stumbling block, and a big one it was, consisted of his old ally President Quezon. Seeking reelection in 1941, the President had thrown all his funds into a series of public works projects to attract votes. By the time President Roosevelt called the first United States mobilization in late 1940, Quezon and MacArthur were barely speaking. Quezon had bought surplus military equipment such as World War I Enfield rifles and obsolete 2.95-inch guns. None of the equipment was suitable and a great deal was unserviceable. Quezon had anticipated that the United States would replace it if the world situation worsened. Following a number of messages involving MacArthur, the Chief of Staff General George Marshall, and the War Department, General MacArthur was recalled to duty as Major General on 26 July with promotion to Lieutenant General effective the next day. He hand selected his Chief of Staff and Deputy Chief of Staff, LT. Colonels Richard K Sutherland and Richard J Marshall, both of whom remained with him throughout the war emerging as Generals in their own right. He also convinced General Marshall to abolish the Philippine Department and recall its commander, Major General George Grunert (ranks’00) since his position was superfluous. Grunert also disagreed with MacArthur on the time necessary to prepare the Philippine Army and advocated a much more conservative defense strategy. At the time he also had a much closer relationship with Quezon, who continued to feud with MacArthur over the budget.
United States Forces in the Philippines when MacArthur resumed command totaled 516 officers, 2,036 American enlisted men and 7,921 Philippine Scouts., in the US Army Philippine Division. The majority of the American enlisted personnel ware assigned to the 31st Infantry Regiment, the only all American combat unit in the Commonwealth. All units including the Philippine Division totaled 1,434 officers, 9,161 American enlisted men, and 11,937 Philippine Scouts. Non divisional combat units included the 26th Cavalry Regiment (PS) and 43rd Infantry (PS), both closer to a battalion in size, and two scout Artillery Regiments (also battalions in size). The Harbor Defense Unit consisted of four Coast Artillery Brigades, one of which, the 59th, controlled the big coastal defense guns in Manila Bay; another, the 60th , was Antiaircraft; and the remaining two were smaller Scout units. There was a small Air Corps contingent with two groups, the 24th Pursuit and 19th Bombardment, and a smaller service element.
The mobilization of the ten Philippine reserve divisions was incremental with the last two scheduled to be completed on December 15, 1941. On August 15, MacArthur incorporated into the U.S. Air Corps the Philippine Army Air Corps of 500 personnel. He issued orders on September 1 that one regiment of each of the ten divisions was to report for duty along with the cadres of the other units. The second regiments were called early in November, but when war broke out on December 8 not a single division had been completely mobilized, not one of the units was at full strength, and no anti-tank units were formed because of the lack of equipment. A school at Baguio was operating to train the senior U.S. advisors and senior Filipino commanders. To each division were assigned up to forty American officers and twenty senior American enlisted or senior Philippine Scouts as instructors. This severely impacted the Scout units who lost many key officer and enlisted personnel. General Brougher assumed command of the newly activated 11th PA Division at Baguio in November 1941. When he arrived, he found only one regiment, the 11th, commanded by Colonel Glenn Townsend (Olivet’11). The regiment had about 30 days of individual training, and had the advantage of one battalion, the 2nd, of Igorot troops. Two more regiments were to be activated and cadred in November. These were assigned to Majors Nolan and Moses, more about which will be learned later. The Majors had less than half of their assigned 1780 personnel, less equipment, and no experienced NCO’s. The Artillery Regiment, under Colonel James F Hughes (KaNG’06), was in the same shape with only eight 75mm guns and the Anti-Tank battalion was never activated at all. General Brougher pointed out the difficulty of passing orders in five different languages and we all know how a message gets garbled as it passes through several echelons in one language let alone several. The 11th was considered in the best shape of the new divisions and would be the first to contact the enemy. General Chynoweth, on Panay, found his division with only two regiments, one of which had no training. His men had five rounds of ammunition for each Enfield rifle and had never fired on a range. Such was the condition Philippine Reserve Divisions on which the defense of the country depended. The 1st Philippine Regular Division was formed from the staff, cadets, and employees of the PMA to which Superintendent Fidel Segundo (USMA’17) added over 4000 volunteers. Only the first battalion (1ST LT. Godofredo Mendoza, PMA’38) of the first regiment (Captain Alfredo Santos, Mapua’24 and Assistant Commandant) was even armed when the division commenced deployment along the beaches of Lingayan
